

## **Abstract**

In this current study, selectivity in public goods dilemma is distinguished between (a) sticking selectivity: the capability to stick with the preferred players, and (b) exit selectivity: the capability to leave non-preferred players. The exit and entry mechanisms with different levels of exit and sticking selectivity were investigated for their possible impacts on cooperation in public goods dilemma. It was predicted that whether contributors can exit, stay and enter the group freely or not mediated their contributions. A significant four-way-interaction of Social Value Orientation  $\times$  Exit  $\times$  Stay  $\times$  Enter on cooperation was found. Moreover, this study also explored post-cooperation-decisions: (a) whether players wanted to stay or leave the group, (b) whether they wanted to vote out their group members, and (c) if yes, which group members to be voted out, and (d) the selection criteria of newcomers.